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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge: 
 
FFE Transportation Services, Inc. ("FFE") appeals from 
the judgment of the district court finding FFE liable to Beta 
Spawn, Inc. for the value of a shipment of mushr oom 
spawn damaged during transport. FFE contends that the 
district court erred in finding (1) that Beta Spawn 
established a prima facie case under the Car mack 
Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 
S 11706; (2) that FFE's tariff was not applicable to the 
shipment at issue; and (3) that FFE had agreed to maintain 
the temperature of its trailer at 34 degr ees Fahrenheit1 
when transporting the spawn. Because we hold that the 
district court ruled correctly on all thr ee issues, we affirm 
the judgment of the district court in favor of Beta Spawn on 
its claim for damages and against FFE on its counter claim 
to recover freight charges. 
 
I. Background 
 
Beta Spawn, a Pennsylvania corporation, supplies 
mushroom spawn to the mushroom industry. 2 At all times 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. All references to "degrees" herein are to the Fahrenheit scale. 
 
2. "Spawn are the `fragments of mycelia used to start a mushroom 
culture.' " Beta Spawn v. FFE T ransp. Servs., Inc., No. 99-0815, 2000 WL 
288332, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2000) (citation omitted). 
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relevant to this case, Beta Spawn has been the exclusive 
distributor of a variety of spawn from Italy known as 
Italspawn. FFE is a common carrier hired by Beta Spawn to 
transport a shipment of Italspawn from Camarillo, 
California to Beta Spawn's facility in Pennsylvania. 
 
According to the district court's findings, mushroom 
spawn are "living, breathing" or ganisms that must be 
maintained at a temperature of approximately 36 degrees. 
Harry Testa, vice-president of Beta Spawn, testified that 
when spawn are exposed to higher temperatur es, they 
begin to generate their own heat and to ferment. Spawn 
that have begun to ferment are damaged and lose their 
viability. Once spawn are exposed to heat, attempts to re- 
cool the spawn will not be successful. Because spawn are 
fragile, they must breathe filtered air to avoid 
contamination. For that reason, spawn ar e packaged in 
clear, plastic bags with air filters on each bag. 
Condensation and yellow discoloration are signs of 
contaminated spawn. Damaged spawn also have a 
characteristic odor similar to that of vinegar . 
 
In June 1997, Beta Spawn sold a truckload shipment of 
Italspawn (the "June Shipment") to Peterson's Ranch in 
Camarillo, California.3 Louis Peterson, an officer and 
director of Mushrooms, Etc. who received the shipment in 
California, testified that some of the boxes containing the 
spawn were torn and crushed at the time of arrival. 
Nevertheless, Peterson used spawn out of those damaged 
boxes to grow his first crop of mushr ooms. 
 
In September 1997, Peterson agreed to sell 16,000 units 
of the Italspawn back to Beta Spawn. These spawn had 
been stored for three months in a facility that was nearby, 
but not on, the farm premises and, accor ding to Peterson, 
had remained refrigerated the entir e time. Peterson testified 
that about three weeks after the spawn wer e shipped to 
Beta Spawn, he used a remaining portion of the June 
Shipment to grow a successful crop of mushrooms. That 
portion, however, was not stored in the same facility as the 
spawn sold to Beta Spawn. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Peterson's Ranch, also known by the name "Mushrooms, Etc.," is a 
mushroom farm. 
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On behalf of Beta Spawn, Testa contacted Michael Conn 
of FFE to arrange for the shipment of the spawn fr om 
California to Beta Spawn's facility in Pennsylvania. During 
their conversation, Testa and Conn verbally agreed that 
FFE would transport the spawn at a temperatur e of 
approximately 34 degrees. FFE had shipped spawn for Beta 
Spawn before and had always transported the spawn in a 
trailer maintained at 34 degrees. 
 
On September 23, 1997, FFE entered into a bill of lading 
/contract of carriage with Mushrooms, Etc. of California for 
the transportation of the spawn to Pennsylvania. 
Mushrooms, Etc. requested that FFE pr ovide it with less- 
than-truckload ("LTL"), "chilled" service. Beta Spawn, as 
consignee, agreed to pay FFE $2,685.36 for the shipment 
upon delivery. The bill of lading, prepar ed by Peterson 
Ranch, called for the transport of 16,000 units of spawn, 
packed in 400 boxes. The spawn were packed in clear 
plastic bags, three bags to a box, separated by cardboard 
dividers. Each cardboard box contained holes to permit air 
circulation. Peterson loaded the boxes into FFE's 
refrigerated trailer on 10 pallets, 40 boxes to a pallet. 
Initially, the boxes were only secured to the pallets with 
clear plastic tape, but after the pallets wer e loaded onto the 
truck, William Forbito, the driver for FFE, shrink-wrapped 
the boxes to prevent their falling over during transport. 
 
Forbito testified that when he picked up the spawn, he 
asked Peterson at what temperature he was to maintain the 
shipment. After Peterson responded "it goes chilled," 
Forbito recorded the word "chill" on the bill of lading. 
Forbito also wrote the words "T emp. 34 degrees" on the bill 
of lading. At trial, Forbito explained that when he accepted 
the spawn in California, he took the temperature inside one 
of the boxes and found it to be 34 degrees. 
 
Forbito also gave testimony regarding the condition of the 
boxes. He stated that the bottom "two layers" of boxes on 
every pallet "were bubbled out like they'r e getting ready to 
bust open. The boxes was [sic] torn, they were crushed. 
And boxes open." Forbito did not recall seeing any actual 
torn bags of spawn. After observing the damaged condition 
of the boxes, Forbito called his dispatcher and was told he 
could accept the load as long as he noted the damage on 
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the bill of lading. Forbito then took exception to the 
condition of the entire load by writing "400" on the bill of 
lading. 
 
Peterson testified that before the boxes wer e loaded onto 
FFE's trailer, he opened one of the boxes and removed a 
bag of spawn for inspection. Peterson's inspection of that 
bag consisted of a visual examination of the spawn's 
coloring and a "sniff test" through the air filter on the bag 
for the odor of spawn fermentation. Based on these tests, 
Peterson determined that the spawn wer e in good condition 
because there was no yellowish tint and no odor . Peterson 
also looked through cracks of the torn boxes in order to see 
whether the bags in those boxes were ripped or open. 
Peterson testified that he saw no open bags. 
 
Forbito set the temperature of the trailer at 34 degrees 
and transported the shipment of spawn to Cudahy, 
California, where he loaded it onto another trailer that was 
also set at 34 degrees. A different driver then carried the 
shipment from California to Chicago. When the driver 
arrived in Chicago, approximately 100 boxes wer e crushed, 
but the temperature of the product was 34 degrees. In 
Chicago, boxes were removed from the truck, placed in a 
warehouse and later reloaded onto another truck bound for 
Pennsylvania. When the boxes left Chicago, appr oximately 
20 of the boxes had "leaking product exposed." 
 
The shipment of spawn arrived at Beta Spawn's facility in 
Pennsylvania on September 29, 1997. Testa, who was 
present when it arrived, described the shipment as a "big 
mess." Specifically, he stated that "the bags were broke [sic] 
on quite a few boxes" and that "[t]her e were a distinct odor 
that the spawn had started to sour." T esta checked the 
temperature of the spawn in approximately 10 boxes and 
found it to be between 48 and 58 degrees, which meant the 
spawn were no longer viable. Thus, Testa refused to accept 
delivery and notified FFE of Beta Spawn's claim for 
damages. 
 
Beta Spawn originally brought its claim against FFE for 
damage to its freight in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Delaware County, Pennsylvania. FFE removed the case to 
federal court and filed a counterclaim for its freight 
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charges. The district court held a bench trial and granted 
judgment in favor of Beta Spawn. This appeal followed. 
 
II. Standard of Review 
 
This court has plenary review over the district court's 
choice and interpretation of legal standar ds and its 
application of those standards to the facts of the case. See 
Louis W. Epstein Family P'ship v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 
765-66 (3rd Cir. 1994); Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co., 23 F.3d 747, 750 (3rd Cir . 1994). We review the district 
court's findings of fact for clear error . See Country Floors, 
Inc. v. P'ship of Gepner and Ford, 930 F .2d 1056, 1062 (3rd 
Cir. 1991) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
A. Beta Spawn's Prima Facie Case 
 
To establish a prima facie case against a common carrier 
under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate 
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. S 11706,4 a plaintiff must prove 
the following three elements: "(1) delivery of the goods to 
the initial carrier in good condition, (2) damage of the goods 
before delivery to their final destination, and (3) the amount 
of damages." Conair Corp. v. Old Dominion Fr eight Line, Inc., 
22 F.3d 529, 531 (3rd Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); see also 
Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Elmore & Stahl , 377 U.S. 134, 
138 (1964). After a bench trial, the district court found that 
Beta Spawn succeeded in establishing each of these 
elements. 
 
FFE's main argument on appeal is that ther e was no 
competent evidence for the trial court to find that the 
spawn were delivered to FFE in good condition.5 
Specifically, FFE contends that under the law of this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The district court found that this action was controlled by the 
Carmack Amendment. The Carmack Amendment imposes liability on a 
common carrier for the actual loss or injury to goods in an interstate 
commerce shipment. See 49 U.S.C. S 11706. 
 
5. FFE does not contest the district court'sfindings as to the last two 
elements. 
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circuit, a shipper must prove by "dir ect evidence" that the 
merchandise was in good condition when tender ed to the 
carrier if such merchandise was not visible or open to 
inspection at the time it was tendered. In support of its 
contention, FFE points to Blue Bird Food Prods. Co., v. 
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 474 F.2d 102 (3rd Cir. 1973) 
("Blue Bird I") appeal after remand, 492 F.2d 1329 (3rd Cir. 
1974) ("Blue Bird II"). W e believe that FFE's reliance on Blue 
Bird is misplaced. 
 
Blue Bird I involved a shipper who r elied solely upon a 
bill of lading, which represented that the carrier had 
received the shipment in "apparent good order," in order to 
prove that the goods had been tendered in good condition. 
See Blue Bird I, 474 F.2d at 104. The district court found 
such proof insufficient to establish the condition of the 
goods because the goods were in a sealed trailer and 
therefore not open for inspection. Bluebird Food Prods. Co. 
v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co., 329 F . Supp. 1116, 1118 
(E.D. Pa. 1971), vacated 474 F.2d 102 (3rd Cir. 1973). The 
district court stated rather broadly, however , that "[w]here 
merchandise is sealed in a trailer, and the contents are not 
open and visible, the plaintiff must establish by direct 
evidence that the goods were delivered to the carrier in good 
order." Id. After initially r emanding the case for the district 
court to determine whether the trailer was indeed sealed, 
we affirmed the district court's finding that a bill of lading 
was insufficient to prove the condition of goods which had 
been in a sealed container. See Blue Bir d II, 492 F.2d at 
1331. Nevertheless, because the shipper in Blue Bird 
exclusively relied on the bill of lading, this court never 
reached the issue of what type of evidence--in addition to 
a clean bill of lading--would establish that the merchandise 
had been delivered in good condition.6 
 
Other courts, apparently focusing on the "direct evidence" 
requirement in the district court's opinion, have cited Blue 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We explicitly stated in Blue Bird II, "[t]he issue presented is whether 
the introduction of a bill of lading with the notation `Received . . . the 
property described below, in apparent good order . . .' is sufficient to 
establish the good condition of the lading at the time it was delivered by 
the shipper to the carrier." Blue Bir d II, 492 F.2d at 1331. 
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Bird for the proposition that wher e goods are not open and 
visible, a shipper may present only dir ect evidence, as 
opposed to circumstantial evidence, in or der to establish 
the condition of its goods. See, e.g. , D.P. Apparel Corp. v. 
Roadway Express, Inc., 736 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1984) ("In 
fact, where the contents of the shipment ar e not visible or 
open for inspection, additional direct and affirmative proof 
is necessary to show that the cloth was in good condition 
when delivered to Roadway") (citing, inter alia, Blue Bird I, 
474 F.2d at 107-08); see also Ed Miniat, Inc. v. Baltimore 
and Ohio R.R. Co., 587 F.2d 1277, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
("Under section 20(11) [of the Carmack Amendment], the 
burden of establishing the condition of the beef when 
entrusted to the railroad clearly lies on the shipper and 
discharging this burden requir es some direct evidence of 
this condition.") (citations omitted). 
 
In our view, however, the holding in Blue Bird, and even 
the "must establish direct evidence" language in the district 
court's opinion, were simply directed at making shippers 
produce evidence, other than a clean bill of lading, to 
establish the condition of goods which were not open and 
visible for the carrier's inspection. Accordingly, we reject the 
view that Blue Bird renders all circumstantial evidence 
irrelevant where the goods are not open and visible.7  See 
Fine Foliage of Fla., Inc. v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 901 F.2d 
1034, 1038 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Wefind no support for [the 
carrier's] assertion that a judge may not r ely on 
circumstantial evidence to establish the original condition 
of goods when that evidence is substantial and r eliable."). 
Although a bill of lading, by itself, is not sufficient to 
establish the condition of goods that were neither visible 
nor open to inspection, a shipper may rely on other reliable 
evidence--direct or circumstantial--which is "sufficient to 
establish by a preponderance of all the evidence the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. It is logical that courts would prohibit a shipper's reliance on a 
clean 
bill of lading alone where goods are not open and visible, because the 
condition of such goods are unknown to the carrier. See Pillsbury v. 
Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 687 F.2d 241, 244 (8th Cir. 1982) ("Where goods 
are shipped under seal, the condition of the goods cannot be within the 
carrier's knowledge."). It does not necessarily follow, however, that 
reliance on all other circumstantial evidence should be disallowed. 
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condition of the goods upon delivery." Pillsbury Co., 687 
F.2d at 244 (8th Cir. 1982). Thus, even assuming that the 
shipment in the present case was not open and visible,8 the 
only difference between Beta Spawn's evidentiary burden 
here, as opposed to in a case where goods are open and 
visible, is that Beta Spawn cannot rely solely on the bill of 
lading to establish the spawn's condition. 
 
Unlike the plaintiff in Blue Bird , Beta Spawn does not 
rely on the bill of lading as proof that it tendered the spawn 
to FFE in good condition. Instead, it mainly r elies upon the 
testimony of Peterson, an officer and director of 
Mushrooms, Etc. Peterson testified that he successfully 
used a portion of the remaining Italspawn fr om the original 
June Shipment three weeks after the 16,000 units of spawn 
were shipped to Pennsylvania. Although we r ecognize that 
Peterson's success is not conclusive proof as to the 
condition of the spawn at issue because the two portions of 
spawn were kept in separate facilities, it does carry some 
weight in that all the spawn were stored under similar 
conditions. Peterson testified that the spawn--both on and 
off the farm--were refrigerated for the entire summer and 
never removed from the coolers. Further more, the cooler in 
which the spawn at issue were stored had a backup 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The district court made no finding as to whether the shipment of 
spawn was open and visible. FFE asserts in its brief that the shipment 
was not open to inspection because the spawn wer e contained in closed 
boxes and because FFE's policy prohibited drivers from opening closed 
boxes. We do not agree that such evidence necessarily establishes that 
the spawn were not visible and open to inspection. In contrast to the 
goods in Blue Bird, the spawn here were not in a sealed trailer.See Blue 
Bird II, 492 F.2d at 1332-33. Although FFE's policy did not permit 
drivers to inspect the contents of closed boxes, there is no evidence that 
FFE was prohibited by Beta Spawn from per forming such inspection. 
The only evidence that FFE would have been hinder ed from opening the 
boxes is that the boxes had been secured to the pallets with tape 
wrapped around them. The boxes were not, however, shrink wrapped 
when delivered to Forbito. Furthermor e, Forbito, FFE's driver, testified 
that when the boxes were loaded onto the truck, some of the boxes' top 
lids were open such that he could see some of the bags of spawn. 
Nonetheless, because we hold that Blue Bir d does not prohibit Beta 
Spawn from relying on circumstantial evidence, we need not affirmatively 
decide whether or not the spawn were open and visible. 
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generator in case of power outage. Peterson visited the 
facilities where the spawn were stor ed every three to four 
days. 
 
Peterson's assertion that he maintained the spawn at a 
proper temperature during the summer was corroborated to 
some degree by Forbito's testimony that when he received 
the spawn, the temperature inside the boxes was 34 
degrees and by evidence that the temperatur e was at 34 
degrees when the truck reached Chicago. As Testa testified, 
once spawn is exposed to heat, an attempt to r e-cool the 
spawn will not be successful. Therefore, the fact that the 
boxes were at 34 degrees on the day they were tendered to 
FFE and on the day they reached Chicago tends to show 
that the spawn previously had been stor ed at the proper 
temperature and were in good condition when tendered to 
FFE. 
 
In addition, Peterson personally examined one of the bags 
of spawn before it was loaded onto FFE's trailer. There was 
no "characteristic odor" of spawn fermentation nor did the 
bag have a yellowish tint which signifies damaged spawn. 
Peterson's testimony that the bag contained good pr oduct 
was direct evidence only as to the condition of the spawn in 
that particular bag, but was circumstantial evidence of the 
spawn's condition in the other bags, as the bags had all 
been stored and loaded together. FFE asserts that there 
was insufficient proof that the spawn wer e in good 
condition in light of the fact that Forbito took exception to 
all four hundred boxes on the bill of lading and testified 
that the bottom two layers of boxes on every pallet were 
crushed, torn or open. Peterson testified, however, that he 
looked through the cracks where the boxes were torn and 
did not see any ripped bags. In addition, Peterson testified 
that even if boxes were torn, it was still possible for the 
spawn to remain undamaged. In fact, when Peterson 
initially received the June Shipment fr om Beta Spawn, he 
successfully used spawn which had arrived in tor n boxes to 
grow his first crop of mushrooms. 
 
Thus, considering all the evidence presented to the 
district court, we hold that the court did not err in finding 
that Beta Spawn met its burden of proof that the spawn 
were delivered to FFE in good condition. 
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B. Applicability of FFE's Tariff  
 
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case under 
the Carmack Amendment, the burden shifts to the carrier 
to prove that it was free from negligence and that the 
damage was caused solely by "(a) the act of God; (b) the 
public enemy; (c) the act of the shipper himself; (d) public 
authority; (e) or the inherent vice or natur e of the goods." 
Missouri Pacific R.R Co. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134, 
137 (1964) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
The district court found that no such proof was offered at 
trial. FFE does not directly challenge thatfinding, but in an 
apparent attempt to rebutt Beta Spawn's prima facie case 
and to recover its freight charges, argues that its tariff 
regulated the temperature at which the trailer was to be 
maintained. See City of New Orleans v. S. Scrap Material 
Co., 491 F. Supp. 46, 48 (E.D. La. 1980) ("A tariff confers 
rights and imposes duties as a matter of law. Carriers, 
shippers, and consignees are bound by the pr ovisions of a 
tariff duly filed by the carrier.") (citations omitted). 
 
According to the record, FFE publishes a tariff that sets 
regulations for, inter alia, goods that are shipped with 
protective services. Section C of the tarif f provides that an 
LTL shipment, shipped "cooler and so stated on the Bill of 
Lading by the shipper," must be maintained at an air 
temperature of between 35 and 60 degrees. The 
temperature inside the boxes of spawn when they reached 
Pennsylvania was between 48 and 58 degrees. Thus, FFE 
argued at trial that it provided the r equisite services in that 
the spawn arrived at a temperature that fell within the 
range prescribed by the tariff. The district court rejected 
this argument on the ground that FFE's tariff did not apply 
to the shipment. 
 
On appeal, FFE maintains that the inclusion of the word 
"chill" on the bill of lading meant that the parties agreed 
that the tariff provision regulating the transportation of LTL 
shipments of "cooler" commodities applied to the shipment 
of spawn. Yet, it is undisputed that the wor d "chill" is not 
found anywhere in FFE's tariff. FFE asserts that the word 
"chill" is synonymous with "cooler" because FFE's Claims 
Director, Raymond Flemming testified that to him, the word 
"chill" meant the same as "cooler." Although Flemming's 
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testimony may prove that Flemming understood the word 
"chill" to signify "cooler," it does not necessarily establish 
Peterson's understanding of the word. Accor dingly, we hold 
that the district court did not err by finding that FFE's tariff 
was not applicable to the shipment in this case. 
 
C. Agreement to Maintain Temperature at 34 Degrees 
 
FFE also argues that it was clearly err oneous for the 
district court to find that FFE had agreed to maintain its 
trailer at 34 degrees while transporting Beta Spawn's 
goods. The district court found that such agr eement existed 
based on (1) prior business dealings between FFE and Beta 
Spawn involving the transport of spawn; (2) a "verbal 
agreement" between FFE and Beta Spawn that FFE would 
transport the spawn at 34 degrees; (3) the pr esence of the 
words "chill" and "34 degrees" noted on the bill of lading by 
Forbito; and (4) the temperature of FFE's trailer when it 
arrived in Chicago. FFE objects to this reliance on extrinsic 
evidence by the district court because the bill of lading, as 
prepared by Peterson, did not contain an agreement to 
maintain the trailer at 34 degrees. 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, "[w]here the contract or 
agreement is unambiguous, parole evidence of prior 
inconsistent terms or negotiations is inadmissible to 
demonstrate intent of the parties." Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. 
Morris, 19 F.3d 142, 148 (3rd Cir . 1994); see also Gianni v. 
Russell & Co., Inc., 126 A 791, 792 (Pa. 1924). 9 Likewise, in 
its role as contract of carriage, the ter ms and provisions of 
a bill of lading cannot be varied by extrinsic evidence, and 
all negotiations leading up to the written agr eement are 
presumed to be merged therein. See Internatio, Inc. v. M/V 
Yinka Folawiyo, 480 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (E.D. Pa. 1979); 
see also EF Operating Corp. v. American Bldgs, 993 F.2d 
1046, 1050 (3rd. Cir. 1993) ("As a contract, [a bill of lading] 
is subject to general rules of construction under contract 
law.") (citations omitted). Where a contract provision is 
ambiguous, however, extrinsic evidence may be properly 
admitted in an attempt to resolve the ambiguity. In re 
Herr's Estate, 161 A.2d 32, 34 (Pa. 1982). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. As the parties do not dispute that Pennsylvania law governs the 
interpretation of the agreement, we will apply Pennsylvania law. 
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A contract is ambiguous if "it is reasonably or fairly 
susceptible of different constructions and is capable of 
being understood in more senses than one and is obscure 
in meaning through indefiniteness of expr ession or has a 
double meaning." State Highway and Bridge Auth. v. EJ 
Albrecht Co., 430 A.2d 328, 230 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) 
(citation omitted). Upon examination of the bill of lading, we 
conclude that the words "chill" and "T emp. 34 degrees" 
written by Forbito render the agreement ambiguous.10 To 
begin with, the word "chill" gives no indication as to the 
exact temperature intended by the parties, and there is no 
explanation of its meaning on the bill of lading. The lack of 
clarity surrounding the word "chill" is demonstrated by the 
parties' differing interpretations of the word. FFE asserts 
that "chill" meant that the parties intended that the 
shipment be kept at the temperature requir ed under its 
tariff for "cooler" commodities. Y et Forbito testified that 
when he wrote down "chill" after asking Peterson for the 
proper temperature to ship the spawn, he believed "chill" 
meant "34 to 37 degrees." Likewise, it is unclear whether 
"Temp. 34 degrees" indicates the temperature inside the 
boxes at the time they were tendered to FFE or the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. FFE argues that we should not look to the words "chill" and "Temp. 
34 degrees" on the bill of lading because, as an independent contractor, 
Forbito had no authority to enter into agreements to bind FFE. The 
record reflects, however, that Forbito drove exclusively for FFE, was 
given authority by FFE to transport the shipment of spawn, specifically 
asked Peterson at what temperature the spawn was to be shipped, and 
was the only representative of FFE to sign the bill of lading. Thus, even 
assuming Forbito had no actual authority to add ter ms to the bill of 
lading regarding the proper temperature of the shipment, we believe 
there is sufficient evidence that he had apparent authority to do so. See 
Leidigh v. Reading Plaza Gen'l, Inc., 636 A.2d 666, 667-68 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1994) ("[T]his court has found apparent authority to be established with 
a showing of (1) limited authority given to the agent by the principal; 
and 
(2) conduct of the agent which demonstrates to the third-party the 
agent's apparent authority to bind the principal."). FFE apparently 
recognizes such authority on the part of Forbito because it argues in its 
brief that we should rely on the word"chill," written by Forbito, as 
evidence that the parties intended for FFE's tarif f to apply. 
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11. Forbito testified that he took the temperature of some of the boxes at 
the time they were loaded onto his truck in California and found it to be 
34 degrees. But, when asked on cross-examination, "And when you write 
on here, chill, temperature 34, that's to keep the product at 34 
degrees?," Forbito replied, "At 34 degrees, right." 
temperature at which FFE agreed to transport the spawn. 
Forbito's testimony supports both interpretations.11 
 
Because we perceive ambiguity in the wor ds "chill" and 
"Temp. 34 degrees," we conclude that the district court 
properly considered extrinsic evidence in determining the 
existence of an agreement to maintain the trailer at 34 
degrees. Accordingly, we agree with its findings that FFE 
did not provide the requisite services under the agreement 
and that FFE is not entitled to recover shipping charges. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Based on the foregoing reasons, we affir m the judgment 
of the district court in favor of Beta Spawn on its claim for 
damages and against FFE on its counterclaim to recover 
freight charges. 
 
AFFIRMED. 
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